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Abstract 
Professional sports with high rates of concussion have become increasingly concerned 
about the long-term effects of multiple head injuries. In this context, return-to-play 
decisions about concussion generate considerable ethical tensions for sports physicians. 
Team doctors clearly have an obligation to the welfare of their patient (the injured athlete) 
but they also have an obligation to their employer (the team) whose primary interest is 
typically success through winning. At times, a team’s interest in winning may not accord 
with the welfare of an injured player particularly when it comes to decisions about returning 
to play after injury. Australia’s two most popular professional football codes – rugby league 
and Australian Rules football – have adopted guidelines that prohibit concussed players 
from continuing to play on the same day. I suggest that conflicts of interest between 
doctors-patients-teams may present a substantial obstacle to the proper adherence of 
concussion guidelines. Concussion management guidelines implemented by a sport’s 
governing body do not necessarily remove or resolve conflicts of interest in the doctor-
patient-team triad.  The instigation of a concussion exclusion rule appears to add a fourth 
party to this triad (the NRL or AFL). In some instances, when conflicts of interest among 
stakeholders are ignored or insufficiently managed, they may facilitate attempts at 
circumventing concussion management guidelines to the detriment of player welfare. 
 
Keywords 
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Introduction 
Ethical issues such as patient autonomy, informed consent and the influence of third parties 
present difficult problems for sports medicine practitioners (Anderson and Gerrard 2005, 
Devitt and McCarthy 2010). In the context of modern professional sport and the emergence 
of the “team doctor” (Polsky 1998), the doctor-patient relationship has been described as a 
triad of doctor-patient-team (Dunn et al. 2007). The obligations that sports doctors have to 
third parties (often they may be paid by those third parties) may create tensions in the 
clinical decision making process. Team doctors clearly have a primary obligation to the 
welfare of their patient (the injured athlete) but they also have an obligation to their 
employer (the team) whose primary interest is typically success through winning. At times, a 
team’s interest in winning may not accord with the welfare of an injured player particularly 
when it comes to decisions involving returning to play after injury.  
Return-to-play decisions about mild traumatic brain injuries including concussion 
seemingly generate more debate than all other sports injuries combined (Kaye and McCrory 
2012). Over the last decade there has been increasing concern about the management of 
concussion in all sports (Aubry et al. 2002, McCrory et al. 2005, McCrory et al. 2009), but 
particularly those which involve high rates of concussion due to frequent “collisions” 
between participants such as American football, ice hockey, rugby union, Australian Rules 
football and rugby league. Approximately 5-7 concussions per team per season occur at the 
elite level of Australian Rules football and rugby league in Australia (NRL 2013, AFL 2013). 
Although concussion is often thought of as an acute injury whose symptoms resolve 
relatively quickly, a growing number of post-mortem neuropathological investigations of the 
brains of former athletes (particularly those who played American football) have found 
evidence of Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE) (McKee et al. 2009, Omalu et al. 2010, 
McKee et al. 2012). CTE is a degenerative brain disease linked to repeated head trauma and 
characterised by dementia-like symptoms, memory disturbances and speech problems. 
Such evidence has provided the impetus for thousands of former professional American 
footballers to file lawsuits against the National Football League (NFL) claiming that the 
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concussions they suffered were mismanaged and that the league concealed information 
about the long-term risks of concussion.  
A number of professional contact sports have implemented concussion management 
guidelines (CMGs) that sports doctors must adhere to when treating athletes. In 2011, 
Australia’s two most popular professional football codes – rugby league and Australian Rules 
football - adopted  near identical CMGs that were based on a global protocol known as the 
Zurich Consensus Statement on Concussion in Sport (McCrory et al. 2009, McCrory et al. 
2013). As part of these CMGs the National Rugby League (NRL) and the Australian Football 
League (AFL) prohibited players diagnosed with concussion from continuing to play or train 
on the day of the concussion; what I will refer to as the “concussion exclusion rule” (NRL 
2012, AFL 2011)(the NRL and AFL concussion procedures were recently updated again in 
2013 to reflect updates to the Zurich Consensus Statement (McCrory et al. 2013)).  
The concussion exclusion rule represents a significant change of stance and is 
peculiar to the management of concussion because there are no specific league directives 
that prohibit players from continuing play after being diagnosed with any other injury. For 
example, neither the NRL nor AFL prohibits same day return-to-play for musculo-skeletal 
injuries. Previously in both leagues, team doctors were simply encouraged not to allow 
concussed players back on to the field if they were still symptomatic. It is clear that in the 
past a number of players who suffered a concussion continued to play the remainder of the 
match even after being examined by a team doctor. Given recent concerns about the long-
term implications of repeated head trauma, it is worrying that some former players have 
revealed that they suffered multiple concussions during the same match, and that this 
occurred on several occasions throughout their career (ABC 2012, Gilbert and Partridge 
2012).  
There is evidence that best practice concussion management guidelines are not 
always adhered to in other professional sports. For example, a recent study examining the 
return-to-play recommendations of medical officers in the English Football Association (FA) 
found that a majority of teams did not follow the recommendations of the Zurich Consensus 
guidelines (Price, Malliaras, and Hudson 2012). It has been assumed that lack of awareness 
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is the major reason why concussion management guidelines are not enforced (around one-
quarter of FA medical officers had not heard of the Zurich guidelines), leading some to 
propose wider dissemination strategies in the hope this will promote greater uptake (Finch 
et al. 2013). 
However, lack of awareness  may only be one cause for non-compliance with 
concussion guidelines. I suggest that conflicts of interest between doctors-patients-teams 
may present a more substantial obstacle to their proper adherence. Team doctors may feel 
pressure from coaches to return concussed players to the field on the same day – so 
perhaps the implementation of a concussion exclusion rule would negate such pressure 
because players would be forced by the league’s guidelines to remain on the sideline for the 
remainder of the match following a diagnosis of concussion. However, tensions that bear 
upon clinical decisions about concussion may not necessarily be remedied by implementing 
concussion guidelines per se. In the case of the NRL and AFL, the instigation of a concussion 
exclusion rule appears to add a fourth party to this triad (the league itself). A concussion 
exclusion rule may simply mean that team doctors feel pressure from coaches about 
whether to apply a diagnosis of concussion in the first place. 
The “standard view” of conflict of interest describes a situation whereby a person P 
(e.g. a doctor) is in a relationship with another party (e.g. a patient/injured athlete) and is 
required by their role to exercise judgement on behalf of this party. P has a conflict of 
interest if they also have a “special interest” that may potentially interfere with the proper 
exercise of their judgement in that relationship (e.g. a team/club/employer) (Davis 1982, 
Davis and Stark 2001). According to Davis an interest is “any influence, loyalty, concern, 
emotion, or other feature of a situation tending to make P’s judgement (in that situation) 
less reliable than it would normally be” (Davis and Stark 2001, Davis 1982). For sports 
doctors, competing obligations can arise because of the different goals of medicine and 
contemporary, professional sport. Anderson and Jackson (2013) say: 
Medicine has long-established values and professional codes that confer an 
obligation on doctors to behave in certain ways; instilling a commitment to promote 
the health and welfare of an individual patient and a prohibition against causing 
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harm. On the other hand many would argue that the central concerns of 
contemporary sport, especially at the elite level, are strongly associated with 
commercial aims and the desire to win. (Anderson and Jackson 2013) 
In collision sports, participation (and the outcome of winning) entails the players placing 
themselves at risk of harm. At the elite level “team doctors” are sought out to facilitate this 
whilst still having a commitment to the “art” of medicine (Murray 1986).   
The NRL and AFL have been applauded for adopting their CMGs and the concussion 
exclusion rule seems like a sensible proposal for reducing the risk of further injury. 
Nevertheless, this paper describes how this rule may create further ethical tensions among 
players, sports trainers, coaches and team doctors. Worryingly, in some situations these 
tensions may even increase the likelihood that concussions may be underreported or 
improperly managed.  
Concussed or just dazed?  
According to the current guidelines of the NRL and AFL there are three important 
steps that should be followed in managing concussion: 1) Recognising the injury; 2) 
Removing the player from the game, and 3) Referring the player to a medical practitioner 
for assessment (NRL 2013, AFL 2013).  
In both the NRL and AFL it typically falls upon sports trainers to initially recognise the 
injury and instigate the concussion management process, although team doctors attend all 
NRL and AFL matches. Sports trainers are regularly seen on the field performing duties such 
as handing out drink bottles, performing first aid, and assisting with the smooth rotation of 
substitute players. They are not medical practitioners – in fact a number of sports trainers 
for NRL and AFL clubs are former players who are now employed by a team. 
To assist sports trainers in making their assessment, the 2011 CMGs for both the NRL 
and AFL recommended they refer to the Pocket SCAT2 (Sport Concussion Assessment Tool), 
a checklist of 24 symptoms of concussion (NRL 2012, AFL 2011). These symptoms include 
(but are not limited to) loss of consciousness, imbalance, memory loss, headache, nausea, 
and confusion. The 2011 NRL guidelines advised: 
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Any player who is suspected of having a concussion must be removed from the game 
and be assessed by the first aider (sports trainer). (NRL 2012) 
The CMGs then offered confusing instructions: the CMGs advised sports trainers to use the 
Pocket SCAT 2 “to help make the diagnosis of concussion” but they also contained a second 
directive that would seemingly override that instruction: 
All players with concussion or a suspected concussion need an urgent medical 
assessment by a medical practitioner. (NRL 2012) 
Given that any player suspected of having a concussion (i.e. any player who displays at least 
one symptom) must be urgently assessed by a medical practitioner, it is unclear why 
trainers would ever have needed the SCAT2 to diagnose concussion. In fact, instructing 
trainers on how best to make a diagnosis of concussion (by using the pocket SCAT2) would 
seem to be unwise given that the 2011 guidelines also stated that “the management of head 
injury is difficult for non-medical personnel”, and that it is “imperative to arrange a more 
comprehensive medical assessment by an appropriately experienced medical practitioner ” 
(NRL 2012, AFL 2011). According to the 2013 CMGs for the NRL and AFL, sports trainers are 
still integral in recognising concussion in the first place.  They are now instructed to use the 
Concussion Recognition Tool (CRT) to help identify symptoms of concussion (the CRT lists 
symptoms of concussion similar to those listed in the old SCAT2, and the presence of any 
one is sufficient to suspect concussion). If a trainer suspects a concussion, then the player 
must be immediately removed from the field for a medical assessment.  
Aside from diagnostic issues and the possibility of long-term harm, some of the most 
contentious questions about managing concussion on the field were raised in a recent 
scenario posed by Mellifont, Peetz and Sayers (2012) in the Journal of Bioethical Inquiry. The 
authors describe a young footballer (Jack) who appeared to suffer a concussion in his first 
professional match but continued to play on after turning away the sports doctor who 
initially attended to him. They ask: “Who gets to decide if Jack can play on and why? Who 
has Jack’s welfare as their first priority: the sport, the club, the medical staff, the coach … 
anyone?” (Mellifont, Peetz, and Sayers 2012). The scenario implies that it is the player’s own 
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desire to continue that it the likely reason for suspected concussions not being properly 
assessed – the young footballer avoids being assessed by pushing away the assessor. Even 
since the implementation of the 2011 CMGs in the NRL and AFL it is evident that some 
players who have displayed symptoms of concussion have not been immediately removed 
from the field to be assessed by the team doctor (Partridge 2011). While it is true that some 
players may seek to avoid being assessed for concussion for fear of being excluded from 
further play, this does not appear to be the case in every instance. In some cases it is 
unclear whether sports trainers have mistakenly ruled out concussion because they came to 
their own conclusions about whether a diagnosis of concussion should be applied, or 
whether they have simply failed to identify symptoms (either with the SCAT 2 or the new 
CRT) that should have lead them to suspect that a concussion may have occurred. This 
essentially reflects the “lack of awareness” argument for why CMGs may not be optimally 
enforced – that is, trainers simply have not received enough education about the concussion 
management process. 
But there is another possibility. Sports trainers do not have the same obligations to 
the health and welfare of the players that sports doctors do, primarily because it is outside 
the scope of their expertise to provide comprehensive, informed medical assessments. In 
many ways the primary functions of sports trainers are to provide “running repairs” for cuts, 
sprains, dehydration and the like, often under the instruction of the coach. These duties are 
all intended to ensure the player keeps executing their role on the field so as to ensure the 
team’s success. Some seemingly concussed players appear not to have been referred to the 
team doctor which raises suspicions that the team’s chances of success may have been the 
priority for the sports trainers involved. If the player had been referred to the team doctor, 
then the team risks having them excluded if a diagnosis of concussion is applied. But if 
sports trainers do not refer players to the team doctor in the first place, no concussion 
diagnosis can be made. Although this is not likely to occur in every case, it is reasonable to 
suggest that for some sports trainers, the short-term success of the team is a higher priority 
than the long term welfare of the player – especially given that there is evidence coaches 
may not always prioritize the health of their players.  
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Coaches may not always prioritize player welfare 
Severe concussions may render a player physically unable to continue however in 
milder cases some footballers may recover from many of their symptoms during a match. 
Without a “concussion exclusion rule” they could potentially be allowed to go back onto the 
field and perhaps play a useful role for their team. Some coaches may not want a player to 
continue after suffering concussion but there are examples of coaches allowing players to 
continue playing despite suspected concussion. This is best illustrated by the use of an 
actual example from the NRL. In Round 3 2011 (prior to the implementation of the current 
CMGs), Newcastle Knights player Richie Fa’aoso suffered a head clash after which he was 
unable to walk properly and staggered around the field trying to stand under his own 
weight. Despite several clearly observable symptoms of concussion (e.g. imbalance; 
confusion), Fa’aoso was not immediately brought from the field to be assessed by the team 
doctor. When interviewed after the match, the Newcastle Knights coach revealed that it was 
his decision to keep Fa’aoso on the field despite recognising that he had probably suffered a 
concussion: 
"For player safety, Richie probably should have come straight off on the weekend, 
there's no doubt about that...If I had my time again, I would definitely do that. But 
sometimes you leave them out there to see if they can get back into the game and 
you don't have to make an interchange." (Dillon 2011) 
This example indicates that player health and safety are not always the priority for some 
coaches. In hindsight the Newcastle coach recognized that the player’s safety was at risk, 
but at the time it was the team’s chances of success that guided his decision on Fa’aoso’s 
welfare. In some cases it may be in the team’s best interests of winning to prevent a 
potentially concussed player from being assessed if there are no other substitute players 
available, or if the match is close or particularly important, or if there is a particularly 
important player involved.  
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Pressure on team doctors 
The 2011 and 2013 CMGs of both the NRL and AFL acknowledge that coaches may 
also try to influence the decisions of medical staff and sports trainers when they are 
assessing suspected concussions: 
“The assessor should not be swayed by the opinion of the player, coaching staff or 
anyone else suggesting premature return to play.” (NRL 2012) 
Surveys with sports physicians have found that they frequently encounter pressure from 
coaches (and injured players) to give athletes clearance to return from injury rapidly despite 
risks to their welfare (Anderson and Gerrard 2005, Price, Malliaras, and Hudson 2012). 
Anderson and colleagues interviewed sports physicians in New Zealand and found that 
conflicts of interest were one of the ethical issues team doctors had trouble managing. This 
is unsurprising given that financial links between clinicians and interested industry bodies 
have been shown to subtly influence clinical decision making in other areas of medicine 
(Choudhry, Stelfox, and Detsky 2002). While this does not necessarily mean that clinicians 
will act unprofessionally, such conflicts of interest should be better managed than: “trust us; 
we’re doctors”. 
Price and colleague found that some medical officers they interviewed “felt rushed 
into making decisions on the pitch side and pressured into approving concussed players to 
return to play.” (Price, Malliaras, and Hudson 2012). It would be wrong to assume that this 
pressure is always in the form of a direct instruction from coaches. Rather, the interests of 
coaches and the team may be facilitated by team doctors because most sports physicians 
report a sense of responsibility to them (Anderson and Gerrard 2005). There is other 
evidence that in sports team doctors can also feel like part of the team and thus identify 
with team goals as strongly as the players. In discussing team doctors in American football, 
Polsky (1998) explains that:  
“Unlike most doctor-patient relationships, it is not uncommon for the team doctor to 
go to the movies with players, join players in card games, or “party” with the players 
at either official or unofficial team functions...The team mentality can cause a doctor 
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to experience the same emotional highs and lows that come from winning and losing 
games that players and coaches experience.” (Polsky 1998) 
A revealing insight into the tensions between doctor-patient-team-league was given by a 
current NRL team doctor (formerly also an AFL team doctor), early in 2012 on the British 
Journal of Sports Medicine blog after the 2011 CMGs came into effect for both leagues (see 
Box 1 (Orchard 2012)). This is worth analysing because it illustrates a number of conflicts of 
interest that require better management if the CMGs are to be upheld in the NRL and AFL: 
Box 1: BJSM blog post by NRL team doctor  (Orchard 2012) 
I told the coaching and training staff that the new official rule was that if I examined a player 
and determined that he had been concussed that day that, under the new rules, I couldn’t let 
him return to the field and the club couldn’t overrule me. However, it was quickly pointed 
out, if I didn’t examine the player, then the rules would allow him to continue. I think 
everyone can see where this is heading. I am either going to be put in one of the 3 
uncomfortable positions very soon: 
1) That I am going to be pulling players out of the game who I have been 
comfortable letting continue for many years, and possibly hurting our team’s 
chances of winning games.  
2) That I am going to turn a blind eye and not examine or fully assess a player who 
looks as though he is fit to continue.  
3) That I am going to re-name something I used to call “mild transient concussion” 
something different like “traumatic migraine” so the player can be allowed to 
continue, even though deep down I think that the player has probably had a very 
mild concussion that has quickly recovered.   
 
The coaching staff of the NRL team pointed out to the doctor that “if I didn’t examine the 
player, then the rules would allow him to continue” encapsulating their prioritization of 
team goals over player health. In practice, a team doctor could be prevented from 
examining a potentially concussed player if the sports trainer who initially assesses the 
player fails to refer them – potentially under the coach’s direction. The attitude of the 
coaching staff described in the blog post alludes to such a situation. 
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However, the first point in Box 1 describes how the CMGs may create tension 
between the team doctors, the team, and the NRL. When the doctor says that “I am going 
to be pulling players out of the game who I have been comfortable letting continue for many 
years”, he is referring to the previous policy of allowing concussed players to continue if 
their symptoms had resolved. Under the 2011 and 2013 guidelines, the NRL has sought to 
take such clinical judgement out of the hands of team doctors. While this may accord with 
the views of some sports physicians, others may see it as an unwelcome intrusion into their 
practice and a lack of confidence in their ability to properly manage players. It is true that 
concussion can sometimes be difficult to identify and that there is still some uncertainty 
about the lowest threshold for diagnosing concussion, but either way, the team doctor 
describes his awareness of how the concussion exclusion rule may “hurt our team’s chances 
of winning”, and that this tension is uncomfortable.  
The second point described in Box 1 raises the worrying prospect that team doctors 
may actively avoid assessing players if a diagnosis of concussion may hurt their team’s 
chances of winning. Concussed players could be put at risk of further injuries - the very 
outcome the CMGs are intended to prevent. There is one high profile case suggesting that 
the preparedness to diagnose concussion in the NRL may be affected by the importance of 
the game and the player involved. Prior to the 2012 State of Origin series (representative 
matches played annually between New South Wales and Queensland), the NSW team 
doctor suggested that the CMGs might not be enforced as stringently as in regular season 
matches: 
"If someone gets knocked out in Origin, we're in strife...The onus is heightened 
because it's a major game. If someone gets knocked out in a grand final, are they 
going to stick to exactly the same rules as if you are playing at Campbelltown 
Oval or Shark Park?" (Webster 2012) 
This comment proved prescient. In the third State of Origin match in July 2012, NSW player 
Robbie Farah suffered an accidental head clash with a defending player in a tackle. Farah 
had difficulty getting to his feet and was visibly unsteady but remained on the ground. Play 
was stopped by the referee while a sports trainer for the NSW team examined Farah who 
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needed assistance sitting up. Curiously, despite Farah exhibiting a number of symptoms of 
concussion, he was helped to his feet by the trainer and not immediately referred to the 
team doctor. Play was restarted and Farah played the rest of the match. According to NSW 
medical staff he had been deemed fit to continue. However there were indications that 
Farah had suffered a concussion that was not properly managed (or at least not recognised) 
by the NSW medical staff because the medical staff at Farah’s regular club (the Wests 
Tigers) deemed him unfit to play in a match 48 hours later due to the same head injury. 
While it is not unusual for two different medical practitioners to arrive at different 
diagnoses, such examples raise suspicion that clinical decision making about concussion in 
the NRL may be influenced by the nature of the game and the player involved.  
The third point raised in Box 1 suggests that rather than avoid assessing players, 
team doctors may simply re-label concussion as “being dazed” or “traumatic migraine” so 
that a concussed player could continue. This is particularly concerning and runs the serious 
risk of delaying appropriate and timely treatment for concussion. Furthermore, because this 
injury would not be recorded as a concussion, the footballer would not be included in 
prospective studies of how concussed players fare. Good data about the long term 
consequences of concussion is essential to better management. Ironically, before the 
“concussion exclusion rule” there was less pressure to re-label concussion as something 
more benign because concussed players whose symptoms had resolved were permitted to 
continue. Upon the introduction of the concussion exclusion rule, one AFL team doctor 
claimed that this is the case: 
''For a minor or brief concussion, what do you think nine out of 10 doctors will be 
calling that? No concussion. Round 1 last year we had two players concussed, I think, 
in the first 10 minutes. Both recovered and returned to the game. Under this new 
policy we would have been two players down … but my big concern is that this will 
mean those concussions won't be diagnosed as concussions, they won't be 
monitored, and that they, in a sense, will go underground.'' (Lane 2011) 
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This could only happen if team doctors sometimes felt an obligation to interests of the team 
over the interests of the players or the league in upholding its concussion guidelines. In 
2013, the AFL announced that it would allow one concussed player to be completely 
substituted each match, meaning that teams would not be a player short if one player was 
excluded for a concussion (the NRL has not yet implemented such a rule). This would appear 
to reduce some of the pressure on coaches and team doctors when assessing concussion – if 
a player can be replaced for the entire match then there may be less incentive to return a 
concussed player prematurely or avoid having him assessed. However, if the player 
suspected of having a concussion is a particularly important player to that team, there may 
still be an incentive for coaches and doctors to return them to play, or avoid having them 
assessed in the first place, regardless of whether they can be replaced (perhaps by a less 
influential player). Awareness of conflicts of interest is therefore still an integral component 
of monitoring concussion management guidelines even when concussed players can be 
replaced. In fact, the prioritization of winning was highlighted shortly after the substitution 
rule was announced when the AFL’s Chief Executive Officer publicly urged clubs not exploit 
it (Thompson 2013). Exploitation of the rule could be achieved by enacting it to substitute a 
fatigued (but not concussed) player for a fresh player.  
 
Monitoring concussion guidelines 
The previous section described how the NRL’s concussion guidelines may not be 
upheld, not necessarily because of lack of awareness, but because of competing interests on 
the part of team doctors. Given this and given that the NRL CMGs implicitly acknowledge 
that conflicting interests may influence clinical decision making, the NRL could be expected 
to monitor and manage these ethical tensions. It is therefore surprising that the Chief 
Medical Officer (CMO) of the NRL has insisted that team doctors in the NRL do not have any 
conflicts of interest affecting their decision making about concussion: 
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“There have been questions about whether club doctors have a conflict of interest 
because they are being paid by the clubs … their number one priority is the welfare of 
the player. They will always make the right decision by him.'' (Prichard 2012) 
Echoing this sentiment, a co-author of the AFL CMGs  discounted the influence of third 
parties by claiming that team doctors only ever make clinical decisions with their obligation 
to the player in mind: 
''I may be idealistic, I may be wrong, but my feeling is that the guys are going to 
follow what they've been doing which is making sure players are safe. You have very 
experienced doctors working in the AFL … we're not going to be doing anything that 
compromises or risks player welfare.” (Lane 2011) 
This trivializes the conflicts of interest facing team doctors and undermines confidence that 
such conflicts of interest can be managed well by the NRL or AFL. The introduction of the 
concussion exclusion rule in both codes came with the assertions that teams in breach of 
the CMGs would be sanctioned and fined (Badel 2012). To date, no sanctions have been 
imposed in either league for breaching the concussion exclusion rule or seeking to 
circumvent it. It is unclear whether this is because the NRL and AFL believe that no breaches 
have occurred or because the oversight and enforcement of the guidelines is not very 
rigorous. It also raises questions about whether sports doctors who have official roles in 
developing and monitoring the CMGs for the AFL and NRL are able to objectively police their 
fellow members of the sports medicine fraternity and apply sanctions when necessary.  
Compared with the way other player safety rules are enforced, there is a lack of 
transparency in the way that teams comply with the concussion guidelines. In the NRL for 
example, a player who commits a high tackle may be penalised and reported to the NRL 
judiciary which decides whether he may be charged with an offence (e.g. a reckless or 
careless high tackle) and if so, what sanctions may be applied. Observers are aware of which 
incidents have been investigated, who is on the judiciary, and all charges and sanctions are 
made public and often receive considerable media coverage. The process is almost identical 
in the AFL. 
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By contrast, the oversight of CMGs is not made public. Again to use the NRL as an 
example, all games are viewed by the NRL General Manager of Football Operations (GMFO) 
for potential concussion incidents that require investigation – although, the current GMFO is 
not a medical practitioner. If the GMFO requires an investigation, he may ask the club’s 
Chief Executive Officer about how the concussed player was managed. The GMFO may also 
ask the NRL’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO) to view the footage of the incident and speak to 
the sports trainer or doctor involved. The CMO then prepares a report for the GMFO with 
recommendations about possible sanctions where appropriate. The NRL has acknowledged 
that some incidents have been reviewed but no investigations about potential breaches of 
the CMG have been made public.  
In the interests of transparency all investigations into breaches of the CMGs (and the 
reasons for all findings) should be made public by the NRL and AFL. These steps would 
increase confidence that conflicting interests have not unduly influenced the diagnosis and 
management of concussion to the detriment of player welfare. Particular attention should 
be paid to incidents where trainers do not remove a player from the field for assessment 
despite symptoms of concussion. 
 
Conclusions  
Although professional rugby league and Australian Rules football have been the 
focus of this article, the issues raised potentially apply to other professional contact sports 
that introduce a “concussion exclusion rule”. The rule aims to prevent concussed players 
from being exposed to further head trauma after concussion amid concerns that repeated 
head trauma (particularly head trauma that occurs before full recovery from a previous 
head injury) may be associated with long term neurological problems. In their paper 
exploring the return-to-play recommendations made by medical officers in the English 
Football Association (FA), Price and colleagues suggest that a lack of endorsement for 
concussion management guidelines allows coaches to push for premature return-to-play: 
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The English FA has not enforced the introduction of the CIS [Zurich Consensus 
Statement] guidelines. This potentially gives coaches the licence to demand the 
return of players when they need them, rather than when their recovery is complete. 
It is widely accepted that medical teams are under constant pressure to return 
players to fitness as soon as possible. (Price, Malliaras, and Hudson 2012) 
However, conflicts of interest in the doctor-patient-team triad are not necessarily removed 
or resolved simply because concussion management guidelines are implemented by a 
sport’s governing body. It would be naive to think that non-compliance simply reflects a lack 
of awareness about concussion guidelines and best practice management. This paper has 
shown that when conflicts of interest among stakeholders are ignored or insufficiently 
managed, they may facilitate attempts at circumventing concussion management guidelines 
to the detriment of player welfare. 
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